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ABSTRACT 
In many cities of the developed world, the previously public owned and subsidized bus 
operators which provided services with minimal exposure to competition have been 
deregulated. Literature suggests that deregulation especially uncontrolled deregulation has 
resulted in an unprecedented proliferation of minibus operators, both registered and 
unregistered. The oversupply of vehicles inevitably leads to a reduction in round trips and 
reduced profits to operators. In order for operators to remain afloat in business, their drivers 
have developed dangerous driving behaviors typified by tailgating, picking up and dropping 
off passengers at undesignated sites, establishing and operating from incidental bus termini 
(along major roads). This behaviour is both a road capacity and safety concern. In 2012, the 
Government of Zimbabwe published their first National Transport Policy, which identified route 
tendering as one option among others, to address some of the operational challenges 
emanating from a deregulated urban public transport market. The objective of this paper is to 
interrogate whether the intention to implement bus route tendering augurs well with awareness 
of what route tendering entails. The following questions will be addressed: What are the views 
of stakeholders on competitive tendering? What benefits can accrue? What pre-conditions are 
necessary for the successful implementation of route tendering? Is the prevailing urban public 
transport institutional framework conducive and prepared for route tendering? These are 
pertinent questions as the country has no experience of route tendering and there are very 
few examples in Africa to learn from. 
 
 
Introduction 
While competitive tendering has been widely applied in the developed world, in many 
developing countries particularly Africa, this has not been the case. During the period that 
competitive tendering was gaining momentum in the developed countries, there was an 
intervention by the Bretton Institutes, which changed the configuration of most economies in 
Africa. Dubbed the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), this intervention 
  
significantly influenced the future developments in the provision of urban public transport. In 
essence, ESAP was geared towards economic reforms and removal of price and fiscal 
controls in order to allow the market to direct the performance of the economy. According to 
Saunders (1996), the areas that were targeted by the reforms included trade and currency 
devaluation, movement towards high interest rates, reduction of expenditure, removal of 
consumer subsidies and privatization of public enterprises. In respect of public transport, these 
economic reforms ushered a new era in many cities of Sub-Saharan Africa. The urban public 
transport sector was deregulated by facilitating market entry to private transporters. The 
dominant bus monopolies were replaced by a fragmented informal public transport system 
comprising of small vehicles; the practice has invariably been ‘competition in the market’. The 
growth of the informal transport sector has been unprecedented and UITP (2008) conceded 
that “any attempt to evaluate the number of transport units remains everywhere a great 
challenge”. The dramatic growth has resulted in a chaotic situation characterised by bad 
driving habits, cut-throat competition, and high levels of accidents and congestion.  
The state of public transport in Harare, Zimbabwe is similar to that of most developing 
countries. Public transport is solely provided by the informal sector which is characterised by 
small and old vehicles, uncourteous and dangerous driving and excess supply resulting in 
congestion, slow speeds and an unpalatable urban environment. The Government of 
Zimbabwe in its first National Transport Policy statement of 2012, stipulated tendering of bus 
services as one of the strategies to improve the provision of urban transport services. Since 
the pronouncement of this policy strategy five years ago, the tendering option has not been 
implemented. The five-year gap of inactivity to introduce bus tendering has prompted the 
authors of this paper to explore stakeholders’ views on a number of issues related to 
competitive tendering. The following questions will be addressed: What are the views of 
stakeholders on competitive tendering? What benefits can accrue? What pre-conditions are 
necessary for the successful implementation of route tendering? Are there ideal routes which 
can be tendered? Is the prevailing urban public transport institutional framework conducive 
and prepared for route tendering? These are pertinent questions as the country has no 
experience of route tendering and there are very few examples in Africa to learn from. 
 
Literature review 
 
According to GTZ (2001), the tendering process entails “the creation of competition for the 
right to provide bus services”. Cox, Love and Newton (Updated) defined competitive tendering 
as the procurement of public transport services from the competitive market by the public 
authority “awarding service contracts to the lowest responsible and responsive proposer”. 
  
Competitive tendering therefore accords a successful tenderer an exclusive right to deliver a 
service in accordance with predetermined rubrics. Promotion of competition and delivery of a 
service that offers value for money to both the tenderer (an operator) and the purchaser 
(Government or Local Authority) are some of the classical arguments that favoured the 
competitive tendering practice. In the United Kingdom, the deregulation of local buses was 
pinned on the argument to drive costs down and improve efficiency.  
 
Fundamentally, there are two forms of competitive tendering; the gross cost contract and net 
cost contract. The gross cost contract, also known as a comprehensive contract defines a 
service to be provided by an operator with pre-specified conditions (such as subsidies and 
quality of service) with all the revenue collected being retained by the authority. While the 
gross cost contract is advantageous in avoiding on-street competition for passengers, it also 
has disadvantages in that the operator has no direct incentive to ensure revenue collection 
and not concerned with the efficient operation of the route (World Bank Group & PPIAF, 2006). 
The net cost contract places both the production and revenue risks on the operator. The 
regulatory authority grants monopoly rights to an operator for a given price (or subsidy) for a 
specific period. The operator retains all the revenue. The operator is therefore compelled to 
forecast his future costs and revenues. According to World Bank Group & PPIAF, (2006), the 
net cost contract restricts the authority’s capacity to make desirable changes to the network if 
such changes adversely affect revenue. The operator is also likely to make conservative 
estimates of revenue in order reduce his financial risk and consequently, the authority may 
end up paying more for a net-cost (Ibid). 
 
In addition to the two types of contracts discussed above, there are other contract variations 
that are used to execute contract awards. Negotiated and Performance Based Contracts 
(PBC) are two such examples. The former contract (which implies a non-competitive bid) 
involves a regulatory authority negotiating with an operator for the provision of a service. 
Continuity of service, reputation of operator and past experience are some of the criteria upon 
which a negotiated contract can be preferred. A negotiated contract can also be used to pacify 
the displaced operator as in the case of the implementation of the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) in 
Johannesburg (Seftel and Rikhotso, 2014).  PBC is result-oriented and aligns payment to 
outputs, that is, performance, The World Bank (2006) defines PBC as a contract in which 
“payments are explicitly linked to the contractor successfully meeting or exceeding certain 
clearly defined minimum performance indicators”. Referring to the experiences of Melbourne, 
Hensher and Stanley (2003), concluded that contractual agreements based on achieving 
designated performance objectives and not necessarily reliant on competitive rendering, hold 
the prospect of delivering better value for money in terms of meeting multiple objectives”. 
  
The drive towards competitive tendering in earnest has its roots in the United Kingdom. 
Following the liberalisation of local buses in the United Kingdom in the mid-nineteen eighties, 
competitive tendering (competition for the market) has become a trend and crucial tool in 
ensuring control of urban and inter-city transport passenger markets in many countries. 
Gulibon (2006) observed the spread of competitive tendering for public transport services to 
countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, France, Belgium, Poland, Germany, 
Italy, Australia and New Zealand among others. By and large, competitive tendering has 
yielded positive outcomes as evidenced by a decrease in vehicle operating costs, an 
improvement in a more customer oriented attitude leading to customer satisfaction, an 
improvement of vehicles, service expansion, increased bus productivity and ridership (Van de 
Velde and Savelberg, 2016, White 2009, Gulibon 2006 and Valkama Ari-Veikko Anttiroiko and 
Jari Kankaanpää 2015). 
 
In Africa, public transport competitive tendering is a grey area. The only country that is known 
to practice competitive tendering is South Africa. According to Walters and Heyns (2012), 
South Africa’s policy of competitive tendering has been in existence since the mid-1980s and 
the actual tendering process started in 1997. Trade unions were not in favour of the 
competitive tendering system as in some cases employees had their wages eroded when 
changing from one operator to the other (Ibid).  
 
Overview of public transport in Harare 
According to Gwilliam (2000) there is much in common in the story of passenger transport in 
many postcolonial African countries.  With the exception of South Africa all are dependent on 
road based modes. In Zimbabwe, before the country’s political independence, urban public 
transport was provided under a franchised agreement that guaranteed a 20% return on capital 
to the operator. Other operators were prohibited from competing with the operator (United 
Transport Overseas Services) within the franchise area.  
 
However, upon attaining independence in 1980 the monopolistic franchised arrangement was 
abandoned in favour of a more competitive open market approach. The major hiccup to adopt 
the free market approach was due to a standing contractual agreement between the United 
Transport Group (UTG) and the Government of Zimbabwe signed in 1977 and was to expire 
in 1987. Thus when the contract finally expired in December 1987, the government bought 
51% of the shares into the now Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) in 1988.   
 
The direct participation of the national government in the urban public transport sector was 
observed soon after independence. This usually involved direct political control of fares and a 
  
further introduction of other parallel forms of transport. For example, the Government of 
Zimbabwe in December 1983, made a decision to license “Emergency Taxis” (ETs) as a 
temporary mode of transport to supplement public transport demand in Harare and other urban 
areas in the country.  They were going to fill the public transport services gap between buses 
and conventional metered taxis. As such emergency taxis were established as a new public 
transport mode and were required to obtain permits from the Ministry of Transport which 
specified routes, passenger capacity of the vehicle and fares. However, fares were 
recommended to government by the local authorities (LAs). The LAs were also mandated to 
provide emergency taxis ranks and monitor and enforce their proper use.  
 
The “pirate taxis” that naturally grew in response to demand in the pre independence era are 
the same that were denoted “Emergency Taxis” post the independence era. As the name 
“emergency” suggests: it was a reaction to a public transport crisis. A point of analysis here is 
that the temporality of Emergency Taxis persisted for 14 years i.e. from 1983 to 1996. This is 
despite the observable nature of traffic congestion caused but ETs in the Central Business 
Districts of major urban centres. This indecisiveness of government caused numerous traffic 
flow problems as well as posing unhealthy competition to the formal public transport system. 
Despite all this, the Government of Zimbabwe still could not adopt a definite policy stance on 
ETs, hence they thrived under the ‘blind eye’ of the government. The advent of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme in 1993, deregulated urban passenger transport paving 
way for privately operated public transport to operate in urban areas. The privately operated 
vehicles have grown at an unprecedented rate ultimately forcing the conventional bus operator 
out of the market. Currently, public transport in Harare is wholly provided by the informal 
sector. The vehicles operated, which are invariably small (minibuses and sedans) are causing 
severe congestion onto the streets, creating an unpalatable environment.  
Survey Design  
 
This study is based on an interrogation of key stakeholders’ preparedness to bus route 
tendering in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The authors adopted a mixed-methods 
research paradigm to ensure the robustness, validity and reliability of study findings.  The 
study relied on a balance of literature, in-depth interviews and questionnaire survey of key 
stakeholders in examining the institutional preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare. A 
questionnaire survey was designed to obtain baseline information on institutional 
preparedness to bus route tendering in Harare, Zimbabwe. This method was used, as it is 
ideal in surveys where many questions from multiple stakeholders are required. The authors 
administered a total of 75 closed ended questionnaires (obtained 70 valid responses) and 8 
  
open-ended questionnaires to the following four critical stakeholders (Table 1). The open 
ended questionnaire (qualitative data) was administered to the heads of Departments within 
the clusters.   
 
Table 1: Clusters surveyed 
 
Stakeholder Tools Applied 
A. Regulatory Cluster 
i. The Central Government 
a. The Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure 
Development 
b. The Ministry of Local Government, Public Works 
and National Housing (Department of Physical 
Planning) 
c. The Ministry of Home Affairs (Zimbabwe Republic 
Police National Traffic) 
ii. The Local Government 
a. The Harare City Council (H.C.C) 
 
 
 In-depth 
interviews  
 Questionnaire  
B. Operators Cluster 
i. Urban Public Transport Operators’ Associations  
a. The Zimbabwe National Commuter Omnibus 
Operators Organisation, (ZNCOOO) and  
b. The Greater Harare Commuter Omnibus Operators 
Association, (GHACO). 
 
 
 Focus Group 
Discussions 
 Questionnaire 
C. Passengers Cluster  
i. Users of public transport 
 
 
 Oral interviews  
D. Academia Cluster 
i. Universities 
a. University of Zimbabwe 
b. Chinhoyi of University of Technology 
c. Great Zimbabwe University 
ii. Polytechnics 
a. Harare Polytechnic 
 
 Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
STUDY FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
The findings reported in this section are based on 65 respondents (qualitative survey) and 8 
participants (qualitative survey). The 65 respondents comprised of 53 male and 13 female 
from the four (4) clusters described in the research design section. The 8 interviewees who 
participated in the qualitative survey comprised of 7 male and one female. Invariably, these 
are all senior people in their respective organisations.  
 
Desirability of a tendered system 
Zimbabwe’s urban public transport is provided by two main modes; minibuses (locally dubbed 
as kombis) with a carrying capacity of 18, although legally they must carry a maximum of 14 
passengers and private motor vehicles used as public transport mainly for shuttling the intra 
CBD routes. These forms of public transport violate traffic rules with impunity, they engage in 
dangerous driving behaviour as they compete for passengers. This partly explains the 
consensus across the sectors interviewed that the Harare City Council should adopt a bus 
tendering system with the hope that poor driver behaviour and other negative environmental 
externalities would be better managed. In response to the question whether competitive bus 
tendering should be introduced in the City of Harare, sixty four respondents (91%) answered 
in the affirmative. All the eight contributors who participated in the qualitative survey supported 
competitive tendering.  
 
Respondents preferred the route based tendering system (64% in favour) instituted on high 
density routes to the area based system. Six qualitative survey participants were in favour of 
route based tendering, one preferring area based tendering the eighth preferred a combination 
of both. The high density routes were those that serve the high density suburbs of Harare 
where there are higher population densities per square metre. This high population density 
provides a proxy indicator of high ridership which enables profitable and sustainable 
operations ceteris paribus. The route based system was preferred because of its perceived 
ease of service levels monitoring and management. Respondents felt that it would be difficult 
to monitor service levels if an operator is given the whole area to operate as an area may 
constitute a complex network of routes some which may be served well and some may not. 
Other respondents noted that a route based system helps in improved network planning for 
public transport and cancelation can be done ‘overnight’ if need be. Interestingly there were 
no respondents who cited low demand loss making routes as ideal for tendering. The desire 
for a more regulated and monitored bus tendering system was further reinforced by the opinion 
  
that the given route must have service conditions based contract upon which service 
performance would be evaluated.  
 
Desired type of contract 
The monopolistic type of contract was unpopular (Figure 1) in comparison with one where the 
regulatory agency retains planning responsibility. Reasons proffered were varied and 
included: the need to tie the operator to perform, avoiding a situation where the operator 
becomes ‘a judge and jury’, and need to strike a balance between the requirements of the 
commuter (affordability) and those of the operator (profits). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1: Opinion on the appropriate form of 
competitive tendering for Harare 
 
 
 
Fig 2: Opinion on the appropriate length 
contract for a tendered bus service  
 
Furthermore, it was found out that respondents were more comfortable with an open / formal 
tender process (58.6%) when selecting potential service providers as compared to negotiated 
contracts (41.4%). An open tender was thought to provide the following advantages: An open 
tender was thought to allow various operators to participate and there is transparency and 
fairness in the tender adjudication process. The ‘best’ operator would come out a winner, this 
would lower chances of corrupt activities. Corruption was cited as one strong reason against 
a negotiated contract and two respondents from the qualitative survey remarked: “The political 
system in Harare is highly vulnerable to corruption and inconsistences. Therefore, an open 
and formal tender creates room for accountability on all parties involved” [Respondent 1] and 
“The negotiated tender is not transparent and in a politically charged environment like 
Zimbabwe can open opportunities for the contract to be awarded to a provider who does not 
necessarily have sufficient capacity to provide the service standards envisaged” [Respondent 
2]. Respondents favouring negotiated contracts viewed them as the best way to go as this 
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model provides an opportunity to the operator to suggest some innovative ways of offering 
service which when debated will mutually benefit the public and the operator. One respondent 
commented “With an open tender, you may not get a serious service provider whereas 
parameters can be set for a negotiated one. Some open tenders can be disguised”. 
[Respondent 3] 
 
Contract duration 
An aggregated 77% of respondents were of the view that contracts for a tendered bus service 
must have a maximum of six years. Generally, a relatively short contract was envisaged not 
to create a high level of commitment while a long contract often creates loopholes for 
corruption in the service performance evaluation and subsequent renewal of contract. Another 
advantage of short contracts that emerged was that operators had no room for relaxation or 
compromise in passenger satisfaction because of the fear of non-contract renewal, if 
performance is below set standards. Longer contractual arrangements were envisaged to be 
problematic in extreme cases of poor performance by operators. It would be very difficult to 
terminate the contract before the stipulated number of years. Thus passenger would endure 
the poor service levels for a longer period of time. Despite the greater weight placed on short 
term contracts, some respondents were of the view that operating a fleet of buses is a capital 
intensive venture with slow returns. This may entail longer periods of time before the operator 
realises profits.  
 
Benefits of competitive tendering system 
In summary, respondents were of the view that a route based contract advertised via an open 
tender preferably for high density routes with a maximum contract period of six years was an 
ideal bus tendering system for Harare. This model is envisaged to achieve a reliable and 
affordable service among other benefits as shown in Fig 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3: Opinion on benefits of bus tendering system 
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Respondents who participated in the qualitative interview also acknowledged the following 
benefits from an open competitive tendering system; getting for money, transparency, creating 
order on the road as operators won’t rush for passengers and promotion of competition for the 
market and thus reducing competition in the market.  
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the relevant stakeholders envisage route 
competitive tendering as a viable alternative to the current system. The next section analyses 
and interrogates why it is taking too long to introduce the competitive tendering system. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
An opinion survey on bus tendering in Harare across the public, regulators and operators 
revealed that there is greater desire for a tendered bus system to be introduced in Harare. 
This desire is mainly derived from the present dissatisfaction and disgruntlement with 
operational behaviour of kombis and other private vehicles operating as public transport 
(mushikashika). Competitive tendering system is perceived to ‘solve’ or at least ‘ease’ some 
of the problems posed by the kombis and mushikashikas. However, the following factors were 
found to militate against the effective adoption and implementation of bus tendering system in 
Harare. 
 
i. Lack of requisite infrastructure and support systems  
A cross examination on competitive bus tendering shows that whilst, the desire is there, the 
Harare City Council (Local Planning Authority) and Central Government are not prepared and 
ready to implement competitive bus tendering in the near future. This is supported by a 
composite analysis on selected preconditions necessary for competitive tendering (fig 4), 
these range from supporting infrastructure to skilled manpower to design and implement a 
tendered bus system.  
 
  
 
 
Fig 4: The readiness and preparedness for City of Harare to bus tendering 
 
The situation obtaining on the ground corroborates the picture depicted in the graph above. 
Road infrastructure and termini in Harare are in a bad state. Currently, the Department of 
Transport at the City is operating with people who do not have the requisite qualifications in 
transport. Lack of a well-managed planning regime was a dominant view expressed by 
respondents who participated in the qualitative interview. One respondent argued on the need 
for managerial discipline: “It’s not just a matter of know-how, it’s the discipline and consistency 
in management required that is lacking in the planning regime”.  
ii. Revenue generation vs negative environmental externalities dilemma 
The desire for a formal public transport system in Zimbabwe’s major urban areas has been on 
the country’s policy agenda for a long time. The first transport policy document, after the 
country’s independence in 1980, enunciating the issue of a formalised transport, including 
mass transit and bus tendering was the National Transport Study of 1985. Specifically, for 
Harare, the Local Traffic Subject Plan of 1997, proposal number 30 highlighted the need for a 
more organised formal public transport system. One such organisation was to be achieved 
through competitive tendering. The prevailing National Transport Policy instituted in 2012 
again emphasises on competitive tendering as a strategic move to ensure sanity in the urban 
public transport market.  
 
Despite all these policy pronouncements, competitive tendering has not been implemented 
and is unlikely to be implemented in the near future. One such hurdle is that the public 
transport industry in Zimbabwe has become a cash cow for the economy. The current poorly 
regulated or unregulated urban public transport market has witnessed unrestricted free entry 
of operators to such an extent that there is an oversupply of minibuses. An oversupply of 
vehicles means increased revenue generation to the fiscus through both legal (vehicle taxes) 
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and illegal (corrupt) means. Table 2 shows a comprehensive financial contribution by the 
minibus industry in Harare assuming there are 8000 (the figure that is often quoted) vehicles 
in Harare. These were submitted to the Minister of Finance and Economic Development last 
year during the 2017 national budget consultations done in 2016 by the Ministry of Transport  
 
Table 1: Showing estimated financial contribution to the national budget 
 
 
Cost Description 
Supplier Annual 
Unit Price 
No. of 
units 
Total Annual 
Economic 
Contribution 
Fuel (30L*312*$1.23) Fuel Co. $11,513 8,000 92 104 000 
Presumptive Tax  Min of Finance $700 8000 5 600 000 
Paye Min of Finance $480 8000 3 840 000 
Vehicle insurance ICZ / TSCZ $264 8000 2 112 000 
Passenger insurance ICZ $236 8000 1 888 000 
Route Authority RMT $75 8000 600 000 
Vehicle licence ZINARA $60 8000 480 000 
Rank disc (*3) City of Harare $300 8,000 2 400 000 
VID fitness  VID $40 8 000 320 000 
Vehicle radio license ZBC $30 8 000 240 000 
Re-test – medical Doctors $20 8000 160 000 
Route Authority Form City of Harare $100 8,000 800 000 
Re-test – defensive TSCZ $13 8000 104 000 
Re-test - vehicle hire Driving School $10 8000 80 000 
Operators' license RMT $42 8000 336 000 
VID garage report  VID $20 8000 160 000 
TOTAL DIRECT 
CONTRIBUTION 
   111 224 000 
 
 
Source: Commuter Operators 2017 National Budget Consultations. 
 
From the figures above it is very unlikely that the government may want to introduce 
competitive tendering which essentially means that the number of vehicles would be reduced. 
Further, informants from both Zimbabwe National Commuter Omnibus Operators 
Organisation (ZNCOOO) and Greater Harare Association of Commuter Omnibus Operators 
(GHACO) raised complaints about the multiplicity of regulatory institutions from both central 
and local government who have a host of conflicting instruments for generating revenue thus 
creating a harsh operational environment. Operators are dealing with at least 3 separate 
ministries (Ministries of Transport, Home Affairs and Local Government) for them to do their 
business thereby creating unnecessary red tape that also results in high cost of doing 
business. In addition to the costs in figure 4, other internal operational costs incurred by 
operators per year are estimated and shown in in figure 5.  
  
 
Table 5: Internal annual costs of operating a minibus business in Zimbabwe  
 COST ITEM  AMOUNT $US 
Driver's schedule 5 
Replacement of smashed windscreens by the police 120 
VID preparations 1  000 
Replacement of tyres(5x2x $130) 1 300 
Vehicle number plates 160 
Zinara licence 75 
Radio licence 30 
Crew wages 4 200 
Service 1 800 
Driver Retest 100 
TOTAL 21 128 
Source GHACO (2017) 
Poor or partial policy implementation 
Another delay in the implementation of bus tendering system in Harare is poor or partial policy 
implementation. Study findings have shown that there is a general lack of commitment to 
policy implementation. Policy pronouncements rarely are they accompanied by Action Plans 
detailing the implementation matrix, as such most policy statements suffer a natural death. In 
Zimbabwe, non-policy implementation has become an institutional culture without 
accountability. Further compounding the non-policy implementation problem is that strategy 
execution/implementation requires a level of managerial capability that is lacking among the 
policy implementers. 
 
Lessons learnt 
From the foregoing discussions, it is quite evident that the urban public transport system is 
neither simple to comprehend nor easy to deal with. Policy advocacy for a tendered bus 
system in Zimbabwe and perhaps in other typical developing countries have to grapple with 
the rather complex nature of public transport. This is largely because urban public transport is 
such a key economic sector that attracts diversified and often contradictory interests. The 
obtaining evidence shows that the Government of Zimbabwe has adopted a laissez fair 
approach towards implementing bus tendering as a way of dealing with the challenges posed 
by the unregulated informal public transport system. The government is playing a delicate 
balance between the economic gains and the negative environmental externalities generated 
by the informal public transport sector. Urban transport in Zimbabwe represents 
  
a problem that is difficult or impossible to solve because of incomplete, contradictory, and 
changing requirements that are often difficult to recognize.  
 
The complexity in dealing and altering the prevailing urban public transport system in Harare, 
Zimbabwe and other developing cities has significant implications for the practice of public 
transport planning. In particular, the difficulty with predicting the effects of interventions in 
detail raises questions about the purpose of planning at large, and what approaches would 
best achieve that purpose. Some factors supporting the status quo and the restraining forces 
towards a desired change (bus tendering) are illustrated in Figure 5 
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Figure 5: The IPT driver behaviour and regulatory policy reinforcing loop in Harare  
Source: Authors. 
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From the foregoing it can be seen that urban public transport in Zimbabwe is immersed in a 
complex web of mainly regulatory factors generating, exacerbating and sustaining the current 
system. Further the restraining forces against the introduction of a more sustainable public 
transport system (tendered bus system) are shown. The major lesson derived from this paper 
is that there is need or a detailed diagnostic studies to systematically analyse the deep rooted 
political and economic factors or pressures that support the status quo (restraining forces) and 
those pressures that support change in the desired direction (driving forces) towards a 
tendered bus system. An injudicious and rushed approach to introduce a tendered bus system 
or any other alternative form of public transport that may ‘do away’ with the prevailing informal 
public transport system is likely to be futile.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The study has clearly shown that the concept of bus competitive tendering is known and well 
appreciated. The consensus view favoured an open tender route based contract for high 
density routes with a maximum contract period of six years. Competitive tendering is 
envisaged to bring benefits such as transparency, a reliable urban public transport service, an 
affordable public transport system, and creating order on the road network among others.  
 
Notwithstanding the desire for a formal public transport system in the major urban areas of 
Zimbabwe, competitive bus tendering system in Harare is far from being realised. The factors 
that stand against competitive bus tendering include inter alia, poor infrastructure, corruption, 
and paucity of technical and managerial skills. The present public transport system, albeit in 
its chaotic state, has become a cash cow for the economy. It is a source of revenue for the 
economy. Revenue is generated both through legal and illegal means.  
 
This study has also revealed the general lack of commitment to policy implementation. Five 
years after enunciating a policy position, no action has been taken. Non policy implementation 
has become an institutional culture. Policy makers are good at crafting policy documents and 
implementation is weak.  
 
The study provides valuable lessons to other developing countries. As stated earlier in this 
paper, public transport in many cities of Africa is in a bad state. Notwithstanding the 
unpalatable state of public transport, competitive tendering is not widely practiced. There is 
therefore need for a detailed diagnostic study to analyse the deep rooted political and 
economic factors or pressures that impede a movement from the status quo. 
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